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STANDARDS TO GUARANTEE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the United States guarantees that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' Gideon v. Wainwright2
held that the sixth amendment requirement of assistance of counsel
was obligatory upon the states through the fourteenth amendment.'
The sixth amendment requirement of assistance of counsel is
one of substance and not form. It cannot be satisfied by a pro forma
or token appearance. 4 A defendant is entitled to "effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case. ' '
"Effective assistance of counsel" is as vague a concept as is "due
process." What it means, and the standards by which it can be guar-
anteed have not been adequately defined by most courts. The pur-
pose of this comment will be to compare the California cases, with
some reference to federal cases where appropriate, to determine if
the standards have been defined in a meaningful manner in Califor-
nia.
The approach will be to attempt to define "effective assistance of
counsel" in terms of: (1) the standard set forth by the California Su-
preme Court in People v. Ibarra;6 (2) inadequate time to prepare;
(3) negligent use of preparation time; (4) lack of individual coun-
sel; (5) denial of a motion to change counsel; (6) poor judgment
and tactical error; and (7) the duties required of counsel on appeal.
Is AN EXACT DEFINITION POSSIBLE?
Obviously, effective assistance does not mean successful assis-
tance,7 for if it did every person convicted of crime could be said to
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Holly v. Smyth, 280 F.2d 536, 542
(4th Cir. 1960).
5 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); see Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85,
90 (1955) ; Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U.S. 271, 274 (1945) ; Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d
507, 511 (4th Cir. 1962).
6 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
7 See Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 850 (1958) ; People v. Nicolaus, 65 Cal. 2d 866, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr.
635 (1967).
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have been denied his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
Nor, does it mean "errorless counsel." In People v. Thompson' the
California court rejected defendant's contention that a denial of the
effective assistance of counsel should be held to exist when it can be
said that without the errors, omissions, or other adverse tactics of
counsel, it is reasonably possible that a more advantageous result
would have been obtained.
The problem is to define standards that are broad enough to
cover many situations yet narrow enough to be meaningful. Because
of the many complexities which face counsel in the conduct of any de-
fense, it is evident that such standards must be pliant. Further, even
when rules have been explicitly declared by the courts there has been
a considerable amount of confusion in their application.
THE STANDARD OF People v. Ibarra
The leading California case is People v. Ibarra.f In Ibarra the
defendant was charged with possession of narcotics, and he claimed
that the heroin involved was not in his possession. He asserted that
his constitutional right to the effective aid of counsel in the prepara-
tion and trial of his case was denied, since it appeared his counsel
was unaware of the rule allowing a defendant to challenge the legality
of a search and seizure even though defendant denies possession of
the seized article and asserts no proprietary interest in the premises
which are entered. As a result, counsel failed to object to the intro-
duction into evidence of the heroin alleged to have been in the posses-
sion of the defendant. In defining "effective assistance of counsel"
and what constitutes a denial of "effective assistance" the California
Supreme Court said:
To justify relief on this ground, "an extreme case must be dis-
closed." . . . It must appear that counsel's lack of diligence or com-
petence reduced the trial to a "farce or a sham." . . . It is counsel's
duty to investigate carefully all defenses of fact and of law that may
be available to the defendant, and if his failure to do so results in with-
drawing a crucial defense from the case, the defendant has not had
the assistance to which he is entitled.10
The court held that counsel's failure to research the applicable law
prevented him from exercising his judgment and clearly deprived the
defendant of a determination of what was the better of the two de-
fenses available to him; his trial was thereby reduced to a farce and
a sham.
8 252 A.C.A. 76, 60 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1967).
9 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
10 Id. at 464, 386 P.2d at 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
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The following sections will explore the application of the "farce
or sham" test of Ibarra, and related cases, in an attempt to determine
the elements of effective assistance of counsel.
INADEQUATE TIME To PREPARE
Implicit in the concept of adequate representation is the prin-
ciple that counsel must have adequate time to prepare his case for
trial. California has long held that adequate time to prepare a
proper defense is essential." In People v. Avilez, 12 counsel was crit-
icized for failure to devote more time to the protection of his client's
interests even though the defendant wanted to plead guilty. In that
case the taking of pleas commenced immediately after the appoint-
ment of counsel. The court said that it is counsel's duty to investi-
gate carefully all defenses which may be available to the defendant
and confer with him about them before he allows the defendant to
foreclose all possibility of defense and submit to conviction without
a hearing by pleading guilty. 8
The question arises as to how much time is adequate time. It is
impossible to set an arbitrary figure as to the amount of time neces-
sary to prepare a defense, since in any given fact situation the
amount of time needed may vary. Most of the cases in which the
problem has arisen involve situations in which there was very little
time to prepare by any standard. For example, in In re Van Brunt 4
about one minute elapsed between the appointment of counsel and
the defendant's guilty plea. However, since it appeared from the
facts that counsel had conferred with the defendant four days prior
to the arraignment, the court held that the mere fact that the plea
came immediately after the appointment was irrelevant. Even though
the defendant's interviews with counsel were brief, the facts of
guilt were obvious, and the court decided the defendant's plea was
the result of a deliberate and preconceived decision.
A contrary result was reached in Fields v. Peyton.5 There,
the defendant Fields escaped from custody while serving a sentence.
He was apprehended within an hour and taken to the county jail,
where he remained for thirteen days, until the day of his trial. He
was indicted for the escape and for statutory burglary, allegedly
committed while he was at large. When Fields came into court, an
11 People v. Manchetti, 29 Cal. 2d 452, 175 P.2d 533 (1946); People v. Mc-
Garvy, 61 Cal. App. 2d 557, 142 P.2d 92 (1943).
12 86 Cal. App. 2d 289, 194 P.2d 829 (1948).
18 Id. at 296, 194 P.2d at 834.
14 242 Cal. App. 2d 96, 51 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1966).
15 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967).
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attorney was appointed to represent him. Fields conferred with the
appointed counsel for a few minutes in the rear of the courtroom
while court was in session and then entered a general plea of guilty.
Sentence was passed no more than fifteen to thirty minutes after
appointment of counsel. The only mention of the burglary in the
record was a reference to defendant's burglary of a "cabin," with-
out any mention of the necessary elements of statutory burglary in
that state. There was nothing in the record to indicate that counsel
questioned the defendant about the facts surrounding the burglary.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth ,Circuit held that the lack
of due process implicit in sentencing within such a short time after
appointment of counsel required invalidation of the sentence and
a granting of habeas corpus.16
The reasoning of the court was based upon language in Twiford
v. Peyton'7 to the effect that: (a) the appointment of counsel in a
felony case so close to trial that the lawyer does not have a reasonable
opportunity to investigate and prepare is inherently prejudicial;
(b) a mere showing of such a late appointment establishes a prima
facie case of denial of effective assistance of counsel; and (c) the
burden of proving lack of prejudice is shifted to the state."
In California, if counsel feels that he has not had sufficient time
to prepare his case he may request a continuance. A continuance
may not be denied if to do so would deprive defense counsel of a
reasonably adequate time to prepare.'9
Thus it is apparent that a definite amount of time cannot be
stated as the amount needed to insure adequate preparation. Al-
though the holding of In re Van Brunt' does not preclude a ruling
similar to the holding of Fields and Twiford, the general rule in
California is that the defendant has the burden of demonstrating
ineffective assistance of counsel.2 It is suggested that the holding of
Fields and Twiford is a better rule, and that if the proper case arises
the California courts should adopt it.
NEGLIGENT USE OF PREPARATION TIME
A closely related problem arises when there is obviously suffi-
cient time to prepare and counsel fails to use it. A case frequently
16 Id. at 628-29.
17 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967).
18 Id. at 673.
19 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1009 (West 1956); see People v. Murphy, 59 Cal. 2d 818,
825, 382 P.2d 346, 351, 31 Cal. Rptr. 306, 311 (1963); People v. Sarozzawski, 27
Cal. 2d 7, 17, 161 P.2d 934, 939 (1945).
20 242 Cal. App. 2d 96, 51 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1966).
21 See People v. Reeves, 64 Cal, d 766, 774, 415 P.2d 35, 39, 51 Cal. Rptr. 691,
695 (1955),
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cited by the courts is Brubaker v. Dickson22 in which there were
three months to prepare. The defendant was charged with first-
degree murder in a California state court and was initially advised
to plead guilty. During the three months between arraignment and
trial, the defendant's counsel conferred with him on only three occa-
sions for a total of about one hour. Two of the conferences were
devoted largely to matters other than the client's defense.
The defendant contended that through lack of investigation
and preparation his appointed counsel failed to discover and present
the defense of lack of specific intent; that counsel inexcusably failed
to discover and present evidence in mitigation of the sentence, al-
though substantial evidence existed.
It appeared that trial counsel was aware of the defendant's his-
tory of head injury and extended unconsciousness. He was also aware
of the heavy drinking that took place on the night of the homicide.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, he made no effort to extract his
client's personal history and made no inquiries of his family, friends
or employers, even though defendant furnished him the names.
Further, he did not arrange a private examination of defendant by
an independent psychiatrist,23 because he thought such communica-
tions would not be privileged.24 Defendant had made several requests
for an attorney and was refused until after he confessed; his counsel
was aware of this but did not pursue the matter.
Defendant's trial counsel had assumed from the beginning that
a first-degree conviction would result, but made no preparation for
the penalty hearing.25 Even though the state offered evidence in
aggravation of the penalty, the defense offered none in mitigation
because, as counsel for defendant stated, he was unaware that any
was available. 26
The court said: "The defense actually tendered was so insub-
stantial in relation to those not offered as to cast doubt upon the
hypothesis that trial counsel made a deliberate and informed
choice."2 The court held that the omissions alleged by defendant
22 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
23 Funds were available for that purpose. Id. at 35.
24 Id. In re Ochse, 38 Cal. 2d 230, 238 P.2d 561 (1951), was cited as establish-
ing that under California law such communications are within the attorney-client
privilege and as such are privileged.
25 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1966) provides that: "Evidence may
be presented at the further proceedings on the issue of penalty, of the circumstances
surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background and history, and of any facts
in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty."
26 310 F.2d 30, 36 (9th Cir. 1962).
27 Id. at 38.
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did not amount to mistakes or errors by counsel in the conduct of
the trial, but, if correct, they constituted a complete failure to
present the cause of the defendant in any fundamental respect, and
did not amount to the fair trial contemplated by the due process
clause.18
Brubaker is an outstanding example of a complete lack of prep-
aration notwithstanding adequate time to prepare. The law does
not, however, require such an extreme situation before relief will
be granted.29
It is thus apparent that if the defendant can demonstrate that
his counsel had adequate time to prepare his case but failed to do
so, relief will be granted on the basis of a denial of the constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel. A principle limitation, how-
ever, seems to be that the defendant is not in a position to complain
where he, in bad faith, was responsible for the situation which
hampered his attorney." This is a valid limitation; if the rule were
otherwise, it would merely encourage such tactics on the part of de-
fendants who knew they had little chance of acquittal.
RIGHT OF CO-DEFENDANTS TO SEPARATE COUNSEL
One of the continuing problems in this area involves the situa-
tion where two defendants are represented by the same appointed
counsel during the trial. The problem is whether one attorney can
adequately and effectively defend both defendants.
The right to separate counsel is not available in every case
where only one attorney is appointed to represent more than one
defendant.3 ' However, if failure to provide separate counsel will
prejudice a defendant's position, the appointment of separate counsel
is constitutionally compelled.12 Generally, the cases require that
there be a conflict of interest between the defendants before a
second counsel will be appointed. These conflicts of interest can
arise when, to aid one defendant, the credibility of another must be
attacked;3" when one defendant does not have a record of prior
28 Id. at 39; see Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
29 See People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
80 People v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d 320, 332, 210 P.2d 13, 19 (1949); People v.
Shaw, 46 Cal. App. 2d 768, 117 P.2d 34 (1941).
31 United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 937 (2d Cir. 1963) ; People v. Ingle,
53 Cal. 2d 407, 348 P.2d 577, 2 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1960); People v. Odom, 236 Cal.
App. 2d 876, 46 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1965); People v. Byrd, 228 Cal. App. 2d 646, 39
Cal. Rptr. 644 (1964). ,
32 People v. Douglas, 61 Cal. 2d 430, 392 P.2d 964, 38 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1964).
33 People v. Kerfoot, 184 Cal. App. 2d 622, 7 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1960).
1967]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
felony convictions and the other does 34 or when appointed counsel
feels a conflict may exist.85
Another awkward situation can arise when it appears that the
case against one of the defendants is very strong and the case against
the other defendant is weak. There are two possible tacks which
counsel may follow-both of which are inadequate. One course of
action is to refrain from making certain arguments in favor of the
defendant in the better position for fear of harming the defendant
in the weaker position. If this approach is followed, the result is
a denial of the effective assistance of counsel for the defendant in
the stronger position3 6 Another approach, followed in People v.
Keesee 7 is for counsel to compare the weakness of the case against
the one defendant with the strength of the case against the other."8
The result may shatter any possibility of an acquittal for one of the
defendants.89 The result may very well be the same if separate at-
torneys are appointed, since counsel representing one defendant
would not be able to prevent the counsel representing the other from
comparing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the case. At
least the appointment of separate counsel eliminates the problem
of forcing an attorney to point out these facts for the benefit of
one client, at the expense of the other.
Moreover, the question of effectiveness of counsel is one that,
by its nature, must be answered in retrospect. Procedural rules re-
quiring such an issue to be raised at the trial level in order to be
heard on appeal" are unrealistic.4' First, they tend to ignore the
fact that, at the trial level, the defense is within the control of the
very counsel whose ineffectiveness gives rise to the appeal.42 Second,
they impute a knowledge of law to the defendant which common
sense and experience show is not warranted48 since such a defendant
usually does not know whether his attorney is adequately conducting
34 People v. Douglas, 61 Cal. 2d 430, 392 P.2d 964, 38 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1964).
85 Id.
36 People v. Donohoe, 200 Cal. App. 2d 17, 19 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1962).
37 250 A.C.A. 901, 58 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1967).
38 Id. at 903, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 781; ". . . The case that is made out, if any is
made out, is to Keesee, not as to McLeod. .. ."
39 "To hear Keesee's own counsel-now speaking for McLeod-comparing the
weakness of the case against McLeod with the strength of the evidence against
Keesee shattered any prospect of an acquittal." Id. at 904, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
40 People v. Monk, 56 Cal. 2d 288, 299, 363 P.2d 865, 870, 14 Cal. Rptr. 633,
638 (1961); People v. Prado, 190 Cal. App. 2d 374, 12 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1961);
People v. Comstock, 147 Cal. App. 2d 287, 299, 305 P.2d 228, 236 (1956); People v.
Hood, 141 Cal. App. 2d 585, 589-90, 297 P.2d 52, 55 (1956).
41 People v. Keesee, 250 A.C.A. 901, 905, 58 Cal. Rptr. 780, 783 (1967).
42 See In re Atchley, 48 Cal. 2d 408, 310 P.2d 15 (1957); People v. Logan, 137
Cal. App. 2d 331, 290 P.2d 11 (1955).
43 250 A.CA. at 906, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
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the defense. Finally, since the question of prejudice must await the
verdict, there is no certain way to assess the degree of conflict of
interest until the appeal.
Since the real problem is predicting whether separate counsel
are needed to prevent prejudice,44 it would seem to be sound practice
to appoint separate attorneys in all cases where a defendant has
made a proper and timely request. 5 It has been recognized that
"[a] refusal . . . becomes a time bomb ticking away in every case
which may explode long after the verdict has become history."4
Failure to appoint separate counsel upon timely request is to risk
deprivation of the basic constitutional guarantees of the sixth amend-
ment. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Glasser v.
United States:47
Irrespective of any conflict of interest, the additional burden of
representing another party may conceivably impair counsel's effective-
ness .... The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental
and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial.48
This language is limited to a great extent by the fact that in
Glasser there was a showing of a conflict, and subsequent cases have
interpreted the holding of the case as being limited to situations in
which a conflict does exist or may possibly exist.4 9 It is submitted
that the language of the Supreme Court may have greater import
when applied to conditions which exist today than it did when
applied to the circumstances which existed twenty-five years ago.
No valid reason appears which would justify risking the denial of
a constitutional right for the sake of the convenience of having one
counsel represent two defendants. The situation probably does not
occur often enough to deny separate counsel on the ground that
it would greatly overburden the judicial machinery. Since an increase
in the burden did not prevent the United States Supreme Court from
holding that indigents must be provided with counsel,' it would
not seem to be controlling here.
The right to the "effective assistance of counsel" is as basic as
the "right to counsel"; the terms are equivalent. In view of the ex-
44 People v. Odom, 236 Cal. App. 2d 876, 879-80, 46 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455 (1965).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 880, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 455. Yet, in this case it was found that appoint-
ment of separate counsel was not necessary since the usual prejudices were not
present.
47 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
48 Id. at 75-76.
49 United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 937 (2d Cir. 1963).
50 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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panding protection given defendants in the continuing process of
refinement of the elements vital to a fair trial, it is submitted that a
better approach to the problem would be for the judge to appoint
separate counsel whenever he deemed it desirable and to require
appointment whenever a request was made by the defendant. The
latter suggestion would insure equal protection of the laws by
allowing the indigent defendant the same right to separate counsel
as a wealthy one, even without cause.5
DENIAL OF A MOTION To CHANGE COUNSEL
An indigent defendant does not have a right to the appointment
of a particular attorney.12 During trial, a defendant may be granted
a continuance if he has either retained private counsel or asserted
an intention to retain private counsel.5" However, he is neither en-
titled to the appointment of private counsel nor entitled to appoint-
ment of another public counsel without showing some reason why
the aid given by his present appointed counsel is ineffective. 4
However, it is not incumbent upon the attorney to conduct the
trial according to the whims of the defendant. 5 It has been unsuc-
cessfully argued that if the defendant were rich and the attorney
refused to follow his instructions, he could discharge the attorney and
retain another. 6 In that case the court pointed out that the ability
of a wealthy defendant to change attorneys "like shirts" if they
refuse to follow instructions, is not necessarily an advantage, and
until the contrary is shown, the court will continue to believe that a
member of the legal profession is better able to conduct a defense
than his lay client.57
When a legitimate difference of opinion develops between ap-
pointed counsel and his client as to a basic trial tactic, the client has
a right to the appointment of another counsel. 8 In People v. Moss 9
the public defender refused to call an individual the defendant con-
sidered to be a key alibi witness. The court held that in this situa-
51 Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
52 People v. Massie, 66 A.C. 937, 948, 428 P.2d 869, 877, 59 Cal. Rptr. 733, 741
(1967).
5 People v. Byoune, 65 Cal. 2d 345, 420 P.2d 221, 54 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1966);
People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 417 P.2d 868, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
54 People v. Massie, 66 A.C. at 948, 428 P.2d at 877, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
55 People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 793, 336 P.2d 937, 949 (1959); In re
Atchley, 48 Cal. 2d 408, 418-19, 310 P.2d 15, 22 (1957).
56 People v. Nailor, 240 Cal. App. 2d 489, 494, 49 Cal. Rptr. 616, 620 (1966).
57 Id.
58 People v. Moss, 253 A.C.A. 294, 297, 61 Cal. Rptr. 107, 110 (1967).
59 Id.
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tion the defendant was entitled to a reasonable continuance in order
to change attorneys and obtain the representation he is guaranteed
under the Constitution.6'
The rationale of these cases is sound. If an attorney was forced
to follow the whims of the defendant the trial could be reduced to
a "farce or a sham" just as easily as if he failed to present a legiti-
mate defense. Yet, if there is disagreement over a basic point it is
possible that the defendant could be correct. By allowing him to
change attorneys and follow the course which he desires, at least
he would have the opportunity of presenting his views to the trier
of fact.
POOR JUDGMENT AND TACTICAL ERROR
It is in the area of trial tactics and mistakes in judgment that
it is particularly difficult to establish definite standards as to what
amounts to effective assistance of counsel. The basic rule is that if
counsel is aware of the law but makes a mistake in judgment there
is no basis for a reversal.6 '
In People v. Pineda6 2 the court held that the failure of de-
fendant's counsel to question proceedings leading to the issuance
and execution of a search warrant and his failure to object to the
introduction of evidence obtained as a result of the search, because
of his belief that the state law on search warrants as of the date
of the trial afforded no defense, constituted merely a mistake of
judgment and did not deprive the defendant of effective assistance
of counsel. The court said that there was a distinction between re-
quiring general knowledge of the established principles of law and
requiring particular knowledge of each relevant case in which those
principles have been applied."' It was held that it was a matter of
judgment as to the factual sufficiency of the allegations in the affi-
davit for the search warrant.6 4
The holding of the California Supreme Court in Ibarra was
not that failure of counsel to object to the introduction of evidence is
in itself an indication that counsel lacks the skill and diligence that
60 Id. at 297-300, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11.
61 In re Rose, 62 Cal. 2d 384, 398 P.2d 428, 42 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1965); People
v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397 (1959); People v. Tillman, 238 Cal. App. 2d
134, 47 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1965).
62 253 A.C.A. 515, 62 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1967).
63 Id. at 544, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
64 Id. at 543, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63. Although this case had the indicia of a
lack of preparation case, the court indicated that the facts did not support a con-
clusion that there was a lack of preparation.
1967]
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are required for the proper exercise of his obligations to his client.65
It is only when it can be shown that the failure to object was due
to lack of knowledge that it will be indicative of a lack of skill and
diligence. Subsequent decisions have adhered to the standard that
an attorney's failure to object, or his consent to informality in the
introduction of evidence does not mean that he is incompetent."6
Unless the trial is reduced to a farce or sham, counsel may waive
his client's rights as to matters of trial tactics, and usually he does
not have to inform his client that he is waiving a particular right for
him.67 In People v. Reeves6 8 it was not improper for counsel to waive
advising of defendant's rights under the insanity plea, since de-
fendant had just stated in open court that they had been fully
explained to him and he had understood them. It was also proper to
offer to stipulate that the insanity issue would be submitted on the
basis of medical reports, and since there was undisputed evidence
that the killing occurred in the perpetration of a robbery, to stipu-
late that the murder was of the first degree as a matter of law.69
Even if the defendant's counsel does not present a particular
defense, this will not amount to reversible error where counsel dis-
cusses the tactical decision with his client and the client accepts it."0
This position is not sound because the defendant may not always
be able to determine whether a defense is substantial and therefore,
cannot intelligently agree to drop it.
It is also proper for counsel to recommend that the defendant
plead guilty if the case against him is very strong. In such a case
it is not unreasonable for the defendant and his counsel to choose
to admit the facts and throw the defendant upon the mercy of the
court; the fact that such strategy was unsuccessful on a particular
occasion is no ground for concluding that the attorney who suggested
it is incompetent."' This is not inconsistent with the position of the
preceding paragraph because if the facts of guilt are obvious, the
65 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1963); People v. Garrison,
246 Cal. App. 2d 343, 356, 54 Cal. Rptr. 731, 739 (1966).
66 People v. Reeves, 64 Cal. 2d 766, 415 P.2d 35, 51 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1966);
People v. Robinson, 62 Cal. 2d 889, 402 P.2d 834, 44 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1965).
67 People v. Hill, 67 A.C. 100, 110, 429 P.2d 586, 592-93, 60 Cal. Rptr. 234,
240-41 (1967).
68 64 Cal. 2d at 773, 415 P.2d at 39, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
69 Id.
70 People v. Trombino, 253 A.C.A. 727, 732, 61 Cal. Rptr. 634, 638 (1967)
(dictum).
7 People v. Reeves, 64 Cal. 2d 766, 773, 415 P.2d 35, 39, 51 Cal. Rptr. 691,
695 (1966); People v. Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d 88, 96, 358 P.2d 295, 299, 10 Cal. Rptr.
167, 171 (1960) ; see People v. Massie, 66 A.C. 937, 428 P.2d 869, 59 Cal. Rptr. 733
(1967).
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defendant is in a position to know his guilt and the consequences of
a guilty plea.
The rationale behind the decisions in the cases discussed
above is accurately summarized in People v. Brooks:72
In the heat of a trial, defendant's counsel is best able to determine
proper tactics in the light of the jury's apparent reaction to the pro-
ceedings. Except in rare cases an appellate court should not attempt to
second-guess trial counsel.73
The California Supreme Court said in People v. Reeves: "De-
fendant has the burden, moreover, of establishing his allegation of
inadequate representation 'not as a matter of speculation but as a
demonstrable reality.' "I'
This is a sound philosophy since if it were otherwise the appel-
late courts would be flooded with unfounded claims of tactical errors.
The defendant would have every reason to misrepresent his dealings
and relations with his counsel because he would have nothing to
lose. People v. Ibarra could become a catch-all defense, unchal-
lengeable by the prosecution, so long as the defendant is willing to
make such misrepresentations.75
This position is not inconsistent with the suggested requirement
of having the prosecution prove that late appointment of counsel
was not prejudicial.7 6 Late appointment of counsel should raise a
rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel. Once
the presumption arises, the burden of proof should shift to the prose-
cution. However, where a defendant demonstrates an error in tactics,
a presumption should not arise, and the burden of proof should re-
main with the defendant.
THE DuTIEs REQUIRED OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL
Recently, there have been substantial and important changes in
the standards applied to insure effective assistance of counsel to
indigents upon appeal. In Anders v. California,77 decided in May
1967, the United States Supreme Court defined the extent of an
appointed appellate counsel's duty to prosecute a first appeal from
a criminal conviction after he has conscientiously determined that
there is no merit to the appeal.
72 64 Cal. 2d 130, 410 P.2d 383, 48 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1966).
73 Id. at 140, 410 P.2d at 389-90, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
74 64 Cal. 2d at 774, 415 P.2d at 39, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
75 People v. Cuevas, 250 A.C.A. 1046, 1052-53, 59 Cal. Rptr. 6, 11 (1967).
76 See note 20, supra, and accompanying text.
77 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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The California Supreme Court had held in In re Nash7" that
the requirements of Douglas v. California79 were met when: (a) ap-
pointed counsel studied the record; (b) he consulted with his client
and his trial counsel and conscientiously decided, and so advised
the appellate court by letter, that there were no valid grounds of
appeal; and (c) the appellate court was satisfied from its review
of the record, in light of any points personally raised by the de-
fendant, that the counsel's conclusion was correct. The appeal could
then proceed without the appointment of another attorney, and a
decision was then reached without argument.
In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional the no-merit letter procedure which had been set forth in In
re Nash. The Court concluded that the no-merit letter procedure
unconstitutionally conditioned an indigent's right of appeal. The
Court said that beginning with Griffin v. Illinois° through Douglas
v. California it had consistently voided those procedures "where the
rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's
examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of
arguments on his behalf, while the indigent ... is forced to shift
for himself."'"
According to Anders, the role of counsel must be that of an
advocate rather than as amicus curiae. 2 The no-merit letter and
subsequent procedure resulting from submission of the letter to
the court did not meet the constitutional requirement of substantial
equality and fair process which can be obtained only when counsel
is an active advocate in behalf of his client.88
The validity of the reasoning of the Court is vividly demon-
strated in Anders. In his pro se brief, filed in 1959, Anders failed to
raise the issue that both the judge and the prosecutor had com-
mented to the jury regarding his failure to take the stand-a pro-
cedure which the United States Supreme Court invalidated in
Griffin v. California.4
In People v. Feggans5 the California Supreme Court, in re-
sponse to Anders, set forth the following procedures which an ap-
78 61 Cal. 2d 491, 393 P.2d 405, 39 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1964).
79 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), held that when an indigent de-
fendant has a right to appeal, counsel must be appointed to represent him.
80 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
81 386 U.S. 738, 741 (1967).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 744.
84 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
85 67 A.C. 447, - P.2d , Cal. Rptr. - (1967).
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pointed counsel must follow when representing an indigent upon
appeal:
1. Counsel must prepare a brief to assist the court in
understanding the facts and the legal issues in the case.
2. The brief must set forth a statement of the facts with
citations to the transcript, discuss the legal issues with
citations of appropriate authority, and argue all issues
that are arguable.
3. Counsel serves both the court and his client by advocat-
ing changes in the law if argument can be made sup-
porting the change.
4. If counsel concludes that there are no arguable issues
and the appeal is frivolous, he may limit his brief to a
statement of the facts and applicable law and may ask
to withdraw from the case, but he must not argue the
case against his client.
5. Counsel is not allowed to withdraw from the case until
the court is satisfied that he has discharged his duty to
the court and his client to set forth adequately the facts
and issues involved.
6. If counsel is allowed to withdraw, defendant must be
given an opportunity to present a brief, and thereafter
the court must decide for itself whether the appeal is
frivolous.
7. If any contention raised is reasonably arguable, no
matter how the court feels it will probably be resolved,
the court must appoint another counsel to argue the
case.
86
It should be noted that the brief should argue all issues that
are arguable. This would seem to require counsel to include those
issues which he feels are of little value as well as those he considers
substantial. The opportunity of counsel to exercise judgment is cor-
respondingly reduced.
One possible criticism of the ruling in Anders and of the rules
set forth above, which was raised in the dissent in Anders, is that
if there were any possible arguable issues present in the record,
counsel would not have filed a no-merit letter in the first place.87
However, the idea that every attorney is capable of recognizing the
issues which the appellate courts may consider important is dis-
putable.
86 Id. at 450, - P.2d at Cal. Rptr. at
87 386 U.S. 738, 746 (1967).
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Anders and Feggans represent one more step in the attempt to
establish the indigent's right to fully enjoy the guarantees of the
United States Constitution.
CONCLUSION
In the area of adequate time to prepare, when it is shown that
counsel was appointed shortly before trial, the courts should require
the prosecution to show that the defendant was not prejudiced. If
the state fails to show lack of prejudice, the conviction should be
reversed notwithstanding the failure of the defendant to show that
he was prejudiced by the late appointment.
If the defendant's position is prejudiced by his attorney's negli-
gent use of adequate preparation time, relief will be granted. The
burden of demonstrating prejudice is upon the defendant. This posi-
tion is sound because it should be presumed that the attorney used
the time properly.
Further, since the trend of the law is to establish stringent stan-
dards in order to guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel,
in any case where there are multiple defendants being tried, the
court should, on its own motion, appoint separate counsel for every
defendant if it considers such action advisable. Also, the court
should be required to appoint separate counsel whenever a request
is made by the defendant. Such a procedure will help insure the
defendant's right to "effective assistance of counsel" without neces-
sitating an inquiry into the possiblity of prejudice prior to trial.
In the area of tactics and judgment by trial counsel, the courts
permit a great degree of latitude before they hold that assistance
was in fact ineffective. It does not seem practical to even attempt to
construct a definite standard beyond that set forth in People v.
Ibarra. Almost every case presents a different problem, in a different
setting and, consequently, must be decided upon its own facts.
The standards prescribed in Feggans appear to solve most of
the problems of inadequate representation of indigents on appeal.
However, it is difficult to determine whether these new standards will
eliminate the problem.
Terrance L. Stinnett
